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FRESH WATER: ENVIRONMENT OR TRADE?
Sanford E. Gaines

t

There is a bottle of water on the speaker's stand. The brand is called
"Sahara Burst." It sounds like it could have come from North Africa, but if
you take a close look at the label, the water in that bottle comes from Canada,
from a spring in Ontario. Although the water was bottled in Canada, the
company that packaged it is based in Houston. So, there you have it: water
in the globalized marketplace.
Bottled water has been, from the beginning, clearly recognized in NAFTA
(and it would presumably be recognized in the WTO) as a "good" in trade.
Therefore, the way that either Canada or the United States manages access to
that commercial good - that is, the import or export of that product - is
subject to all of the familiar requirements of the international trade regime. I
also believe that the distinction that has been drawn by the NAFTA parties in
their statement between water as a resource and water as a good is a
distinction that has only a small element of validity.' For most all practical
purposes, I think it would break down rather quickly.
Nevertheless, that distinction was maintained in the U.S. government
response to the International Joint Commission.2 The IJC asked the Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative to comment on the trade-related aspects of
water management in the Great Lakes. The USTR response includes the
following statement from a deputy trade representative: "The WTO simply
has nothing to say regarding the basic decision by governments on whether
to permit extraction of water from lakes and rivers...
That is actually, I think, a fair statement, but we must be careful about the
limitations that are embedded in that statement. It says that the WTO has
nothing to say about a decision whether to permit the extraction in the first
place. Fair enough; if you want to have a national, provincial or local policy
t Law Foundation Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center, Houston, Texas.
B.A., magna cum laude, Harvard College; M.A., J.D., cum laude, Harvard University.
Additional biographical information available at page xii.
1 See Milos Barutciski, Trade Regulation of Fresh Water Imports: The Phantom Menace
Revisited, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 143, 144-46 (2002).
2 INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE GREAT LAKES:

Appendix C, at 65
(2000), available at http://www.ijc.org/boards/cde/finalreport/finalreport.pdf [hereinafter IJC
FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES,
REPORT].

3 Id.
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that says nobody may take any water out of this spring, lake or river; that is
okay. Why would the WTO care? The policy does not, in and of itself, have
any influence on trade or trade relationships. The U.S. statement discusses at
some length the fact that decisions about management - especially the
management of transboundary lakes and rivers such as those covered under
the Boundary Waters Treaty4 that the United States has with Canada or the
comparable treaties with Mexico 5 - are covered by a whole body of
international law on the use and allocation of international water courses, and
this law has never been called into question by the international trade
system. 6 Thus, basic resource management decisions such as those
concerning where water in its natural state goes, what the quality of the water
should be, which types of users (as between agricultural and industrial users
and so forth) are allowed to withdraw, whether a dam can be built and what
consequences might follow for downstream users, are covered by the
international law of water courses and do not impinge on trade relationships.
. But, of course (just to be clear): if at some point you decide that your
water resources can be privately appropriated and put into the stream of
commerce - if Ontario allows the water from a spring to be withdrawn,
bottled, and sold - then the management of the water resource may become
an issue in terms of the international trade regime. Then, as Milos pointed
out, you are in a system where the principles include the rule that you should
not discriminate between local users and foreign users or between users from
the United States and Bahrain, and you cannot, as part of that process,
prohibit the exportation of that water. Even so, governments have substantial
authority, unconstrained by trade rules, to manage their water resources.
Even certain trade restrictions may be applied in the resource management
context. GATT Article XX(g) 7 provides a great deal of flexibility for
resource conservation or limitation of access management rules to be put into
place, so long as they do not violate the chapeau of Article XX, which says
that trade restrictive measures to conserve natural resources should not
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against other nations. 8
4 Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters, Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 36 Stat. 2448, T.S.
No. 548.

5 Treaty Relating to the Waters of the Rio Grande, May 21, 1906, U.S.-Mex., 34 Stat.
2953, T.S. No. 455 (covering the upper Rio Grande basin); Treaty Relating to the Utilization
of the Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, U.S.Mex., 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994.
6 IJC REPORT, supra note 2, at 65.
7 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX(g), 61 Stat. A-I1, A61, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 262 (incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M.
1125, 1154 (1994)).
8 See id.,art.XX(1).
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In my remaining time, I would like to consider not where we are today
but where we might be in the future in terms of the Great Lakes in particular,
and to give you a view from the South. In that, I do not refer to the south
shore of Lake Erie, but the southern border of the United States and the
northern part of Mexico. It is a region, like many others in the world, where
water is scarce, and allocation and use of water are life-and-death issues and
have been for centuries. I will analogize what is going on in water
management along the southern border to what is happening here in the
Great Lakes Basin. I hope it gives you a different perspective on water
issues, one that is germane to the U.S.-Canada and Great Lakes context.
WATER AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: DIMENSIONS OF
CHANGE
The southern border water issues were the genesis of the infamous
Harmon Doctrine. Mr. Judson Harmon was an attorney general of the United
States in the late 19th Century. 9 In the context of some burgeoning disputes
between the United States and Mexico over our common rivers or shared
rivers (the Colorado and the Rio Grande), Attorney General Harmon
pronounced that' waters in the United States were subject to the absolute
sovereign control of the United States, which thus could unilaterally decide
what it wanted to do with that water. Specifically, according to Harmon, the
United States held no obligation at all to Mexico in terms of the amount of
water available at or along the border because the upstream waters were
exclusively U.S. resources. This Doctrine was abandoned not too long
thereafter, and is now held in disrepute by modern-day international water
lawyers. ° But I mention the Harmon Doctrine because it strikes me that the
UC recommendation for a presumptive policy that the Great Lakes
governments "should not permit any proposal for removal of water from the
Great Lakes Basin"" sounds of Harmon Doctrine overtones - this is our
resource, and we alone will decide how it is used. The fact that two nations
have joined in enunciating this version of the Harmon Doctrine does not
automatically rescue it from "unilateralism." The fresh water in the Great
Lakes has world significance and potential beneficial users come from as far
away as Asia.

9 Judson Harmon (1846-1927), a Cincinnati attorney, served as Attorney General from
1895-97 in the second Grover Cleveland administration. He later became governor of Ohio
from 1909 to 1913.
See Judson Harmon, at http://www.ohiohistory.org/onlinedoc/
ohgovernment/governors/harmon.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2002).
10 The Harmon Doctrine has been almost universally rejected. See Kasikili/Sedudu Island
(Bots. v. Namib.), 39 I.L.M. 309, 381 (2000).
11 IJC REPORT, supra note 2, at 47.
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One commentator on the Rio Grande has observed: "We are slow to
define the dimensions of change, slower to agree that it demands adaptation,
and slowest of all in implementing needed adjustments, which are nearly
always complex and
difficult, requiring new political consensus and
'2
itistitutional change."'
There are three dimensions of change facing the U.S. and Canada even
here in this water-rich northern region: (1) the increasing scarcity of fresh
water in the world at large; (2) the increasing interconnectedness of the world
communities (globalization, if you will); and (3) the changing awareness of
the complex interactions between ecosystems and the complexities of
different legal and management tools for managing those interactions. To
implement a "no-export" or "no inter-basin transfers" policy is a rather
simple-minded approach that ignores all three aspects of change. I am
certainly not saying the U.S. has some right to Canadian water and that
Canadians should make that water available. Rather, I will argue that how
we frame the debate determines, in large part, the options that we will
consider and the way that the debate will be resolved. Let us put it in
academic terms as one writer did: "Discursive themes and strategies
deployed in public debates shape ways that conflicts over... water resources
are defined.' 3 The governments of the Great Lakes region, with UC
blessing, have deployed the "no export" strategy.' 4 That, in my view, is a
strategy that will only provoke conflict and emotion rather than careful
assessment and resolution. A prohibition on inter-basin transfer may be a
necessary interim step. I think it is unsustainable as a long-term solution. To
be fair, even the governments seem to recognize this, carefully avoiding an
12 William deBuys, Navigating the River of Our Future: The Rio Poco-Grande, 41 NAT.
RESOURCES
13

J. 265 (2001).

Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discursive Practices and Competing Discourses in the-

Governance of Wild North American Pacific Salmon Resources, in REFLECTIONS ON WATER:
NEW APPROACHES TO TRANSBOUNDARY CONFLICTS AND COOPERATION 163, 179 (Joachim
Blatter & Helen Ingram eds., 2000).
14 The United States Congress initiated this strategy with a provision in the 1986 Water
Resources Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20(d), that states that no diversion of the
waters of the Great Lakes basin may occur without the unanimous approval of all the basin
state governors. A 2000 amendment specifically applied this approval provision to bulk
exports of water. Thus empowered, the eight U.S. governors and their counterpart Canadian
provincial premiers adopted The Great Lakes Charter Annex: A Supplementary Agreement to
the Great Lakes Charter, June 18, 2001, available at http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/
Annex200l.pdf. The Annex includes a commitment not to approve any "withdrawals" of
water from the Great Lakes basin (including groundwater) that are inconsistent with four
announced principles. See id. at Directive No. 3. "In other words, the Great Lakes region has
said, in effect, 'we're going to make some new rules, and anybody wanting to take our water
has to follow those rules."' Gary Ballasteros, Great Lakes Water Exports and Diversions:
Annex 2001 and the Looming Environmental Battle, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,611
(2002).
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absolute "no exports" policy in their formal policies. I will return later to the
nuanced conditions on exports or withdrawals in these pronouncements.
Relative Water "Scarcity" in the U.S. and Mexico
Imagine for a moment, if you can, the United States as a disadvantaged
party here. It is disadvantaged in that it has rather less water per capita than
does Canada. It is inconsistent with sustainable development concepts to
ignore that element of disadvantage.
Professor Alan Boyle defines
"sustainable development" as development that benefits the disadvantaged
without disadvantaging the needs of the future. 15 Perhaps you will have an
easier time appreciating this argument if I include the third North American
partner, Mexico, which has inadequate supplies of fresh water throughout the
country, but especially in the northern regions bordering on the United States
(and the U.S. water supply is itself considerably constrained by our legal and
equitable water obligations toward Mexico.). Should Mexico, which is
taking steps to help protect Great Lakes water quality, be denied any access
to that relatively abundant resource?
To be sure, inadequacy of supply to meet current needs is not a litmus test
for an equitable claim for access to new resources. As Robert Adler has
observed, "The regional water supply crisis, especially in the West, stems in
part from a mismatch between water supplies and disproportionate water
demands. . . . Per capita water use is considerably higher in the western
states generally than in the East and Midwest...,,16 Wasteful usage militates
against an equitable claim. On the other hand, the West's high per-capita use
stems from widespread irrigation, so the equities and comparative benefits of
agriculture and the opportunities for western irrigators to conserve water
would then also need to be considered, and compared with the industrial and
municipal uses and conservation opportunities that obtain within the Great
Lakes region.
Equity and sustainable development aside, I think it is just impractical to
imagine that the IC can build a "Chinese wall" around the Great Lakes
Basin, and then say that there will never be any transfer outside of this basin
for any reason, or only on terms dictated by the governments within the
region. Further, such a notion ignores the general norms of international law
that nations or governmental entities have transboundary responsibilities and
should, at a very minimum, consult with its neighbors before making
15 See generally Alan Boyle & David Freestone, Introduction,in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PAST ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 12-14 (Alan

Boyle & David Freestone eds., 1999).
16 Robert W. Adler, Fresh Water -

Toward a SustainableFuture, in STUMBLING TOWARD

SUSTAINABILITY 197, 215-16 (John C. Dernbach ed., 2002), reprinted in 32 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,167, 10,182 (2002).
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irreversible resource management commitments. You cannot wall yourself
off from the world.
The boundaries of the basin are more relevant than national boundaries in
environmental terms but, ultimately, I do not think they can be maintained as
impermeable boundaries. The boundaries are not impermeable even today.
In fact, for the last hundred years, there have been and continue to be
substantial diversions of water out of the Basin. The Chicago diversion is the
largest example of water leaving the Basin, but there are many other
diversions of water from outside of the Great Lakes Basin into the Great
Lakes, particularly the Long Lake and Ogoki hydroelectric projects in
Western Ontario (actually, they bring in more water than Chicago takes out,
so there is a net gain). 17 The reality is that the Great Lakes Basin is not a
closed system, and it would be unwise to make policy based on that
fallacious premise.
Regional Interconnectedness
I think we need a new concept for thinking about the relationship between
the interests within the Great Lakes Basin and those outside the Basin that
may have some legitimate claim for access to Great Lakes water. One
concept that fits this situation well is the idea of a "hydrocommons." A
hydrocommons is defined as a "hybrid basin" encompassing the watersheds
of both the sending (exporting)' 18and receiving (importing) basins, "tied
together by man-made plumbing."
What differentiates the hydrocommons approach from watershed
based approaches to water quality management is that hydrocommons
governance recognizes the environmental links between the region that
sends or exports water and the region that receives water imports. In
addition, a hydrocommons approach recognizes the environmental
links between water transfers, water pollution of surface and ground
waters, and aquatic ecosystems degradation. 19
The notion of the hydrocommons focuses attention on the second element
of change that I identified: the idea of increased interconnectedness. We
need both legal strategies and institutional devices to enhance collaborative
decisionmaking among the multiple stakeholders. Unilateral decisions - and
17

IJC

REPORT, supra note

2, at 13.

18 Suzanne M. Michel, Defining Hydrocommons Governance Along the Border of the

Californias:A Case Study of Transbasin Diversions and Water Quality in the Tijuana-San
Diego Metropolitan Region, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 931, 934 (2000).
'9 Id. at 932.
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by unilateral I include declarations by the UC or the Great Lakes Charter
states and provinces, even though they are regional, bilateral entities prohibiting exports or setting unilaterally-established conditions on
withdrawals are simply incompatible with the multiple-stakeholder,
interconnected view of the world. How broadly to define the group of
stakeholders that have a legitimate interest in the water resources of the Great
Lakes is a significant and complex question in itself,20 to which I will return
in the conclusion. But for now, I maintain that a self-imposed limitation of
stakeholders to those with interests within the basin is in any case too
narrow.
Conducting the discourse in hydrocommons terms does not necessarily
mean that exports of Great Lakes water outside the basin should be
permitted. As experts have observed, even though the Great Lakes store vast
quantities of fresh water, that water is replenished only slowly, and
withdrawals for consumptive use within the basin are already near the
capacity of the system to sustain such withdrawals indefinitely. 21 A
hydrocommons discourse, though, at least enables consideration of the nature
of existing and future uses within and outside the basin, the opportunities for
conservation both within and outside the basin, and the environmental costs
and benefits for any receiving basin as well as for the Great Lakes regime
itself.
Resource Management Schemes
In an interconnected world where fresh water is scarce, the challenge for
all parties is to devise and implement management schemes to make the
available fresh water go as far as possible and to get it to the users most in
need. A couple of examples from the arid southern regions may suggest
20

Ballasteros notes that "the debate over water exports and diversions from the Great

Lakes comes down to a question of 'where do you draw the line?' In other words, where is the
boundary at which we say: 'On this side of the line you are entitled to use Great Lakes water;
and on that side of the line you are not."' Ballasteros, supra note 14, at 10,612. See also
Leticia M. Diaz & Barry Hart Dubner, The Necessity of Preventing Unilateral Responses to
Water Scarcity - The Next Major Threat Against Mankind this Century, 9 CARDOZO J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 1, 7, in which the authors distinguish between "equitable" use and "sustainable"
use and then asking:
For example, if the Great Lakes are managed by Canada and the United States on an
equitable and/or sustainable basis and another area of the world is in need of potable
water, is it equitable to take water from the Great Lakes in order to assist that other
region, even if it causes serious environmental consequences to the Great Lakes?
21 IJC REPORT, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that on average less than one percent of the water
supply is renewed annually). Interestingly, the IJC Report also comments that large-scale
diversions into and out of the basin and various man-made structures within the basin have
had a much more significant effect on lake levels than water withdrawals. Id. at 20.
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options other than the current Great Lakes model of political oversight of
water withdrawals based on pre-determined criteria.
Customary international law on fresh water management is built on the
concept of equitable uses, which has two aspects: (1) efficiency of uses, and
(2) a system of equitable allocation or distribution of the resource amongst
the various communities and interests that might be affected by it or have
some need for it.
If we think about efficiency, the idea of market-based approaches comes
into play. As soon as we talk about market-based approaches, however, we
start to tiptoe back into the possibility that water might become a commodity
with an economic value, and under some circumstances that value would
come from its worth as a potable resource or irrigation resource for sale to
someone outside the basin - the dreaded notion of exports.
But in modem environmental law, the sale and purchase of a resource
through the "market" is not the only way to use a market-based approach. In
fact, there is an ever-growing experience base in the U.S. west and southwest
with market-based strategies for management of water as a resource. One
commentator has classified these into three distinct strategies according to
the interest involved in the "market" and the representative of that interest:
"public good markets" in which government agencies or private parties can
acquire in-stream flows; "ecosystem service markets" in which governments
or others acquire interests in elements of the watershed ecosystem (such as
forest lands or wetlands) so as to preserve their ecosystem service values;
and a third strategy, in which the environmental managers/regulators become
brokers for public or 2private transactions to accomplish environmental
objectives in the region.
The leading example of the brokerage approach is the so-called CALFED
Project in Central California.23 CALFED was established as a true
hydrocommons management entity, with the principal objective of assuring
the environmental health of the San Francisco Bay-San Joaquin Delta estuary
but with the recognition that much of the water that would naturally flow into
that estuary is diverted far and wide outside the basin to city dwellers and
agricultural irrigators from northern California all the way to San Diego.
CALFED, as an institution, is a consortium of 15 state and federal agencies,
and its planning process included many representatives for the competing
ecological, agricultural and municipal interests at stake. An important
element of the CALFED approach that has emerged from this planning are
mechanisms that allow different participants in this system to buy and sell
22

See generally Barton H. Thompson, Markets for Nature, 25 WM & MARY ENVTL. L. &

POL'Y REv. 261 (2000).
23 See Glen Martin, Northern California, in ITT INDUSTRIES, GUIDE TO GLOBAL WATER
ISSUES 23 (2001). For detailed analysis of CALFED, see Michel, supra note 18, at 954-64.
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rights to water, with CALFED acting as the broker of the transactions. This
is so that, presumably, the water will be allocated to the more efficient users
- efficient not only in consumptive terms but also in terms of ecological
improvements and ecosystem services. In CALFED and in other examples
from the American West, participants in such water rights markets include
government land and resources managers (such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service), public and private consumptive users, and even environmental
NGOs who may want to assure or restore natural in-stream flows. There is a
system in California, Oregon and other places for governmental entities to
acquire water rights for in-stream use or in-situ use for environmental
benefits in terms of fisheries or other environmental aspects. In this way, the
environmental uses are permitted to play along with the potential
consumptive issues in terms of a market-based mechanism.
Another market-based or economic approach focuses more specifically on
the many ecosystem services that hydrologic systems provide. Let me use
the example of flooding, in both senses. On one hand, watersheds can be
flood prevention devices; in the upper reaches of the watershed, the
absorption capacity of undeveloped forest or grassland or wetlands helps
Thus, options such as conservation
prevent downstream flooding.
easements, outright land purchases, or land use regulations can become part
of watershed management for purposes of maintaining flow and protecting
water quality.24
In other systems, such as in the Colorado River Delta along and south of
the U.S./Mexico border at the head of the Gulf of California, the ecosystem
needs flooding. The typical seasonal pattern of the Colorado River, before
man engineered the river, included annual spring floods from the snowmelt
coming off the Rocky Mountains. Those floodwaters carried sediment that
was spread out over the Colorado River Delta, and those nutrients supported
a very rich biological regime, including substantial fisheries resources in the
Gulf of California.25 We need to recapture those ecosystem services. There
are various ways to do that; some might be regulatory, while others might be
market-based. The point is that if we stay focused on the hydrologic basin
system in terms of ecosystem considerations, then simply saying no interbasin transfers is a very simplistic and probably inadequate approach to a
very complex situation. Inter-basin transfers might, in fact, enhance
environmental quality in the basin, depending on how you manage those
transfers and how you account for them. A system of transfers could capture
beneficial transfers in one place and allow non-environmentally degrading
24 For some examples, see Thompson, supra note 22, at 293-300.
25

For more on the Colorado River Delta, see Jennifer Pitt et al., Two Nations, One River:

Managing Ecosystem Conservation in the Colorado River Delta, 40 NAT.
(2000).

RESOURCES J.
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diversions in another. Of course, inter-basin transfers may not be part of the
answer in all, or even in many, cases. Nevertheless, they should be included
among the many potential strategies in devising an overall hydrocommons
management regime.
I come back to the question of equity in the distribution. Equity, in itself,
implies that there needs to be open decision making within the
hydrocommons and recognition of the interests of multiple stakeholders.
Markets may be one device to accomplish this goal, but you need other
decisionmaking devices to capture nonmarket values and interests. Again,
we have had some experience on the southwestern border with capturing or
recognizing some of these interests. These interests may include, for
example, those of indigenous peoples in terms of water rights that may be
partly for consumptive use or associated with other traditional uses of the
environment, such as fisheries or agriculture. These interests are not
necessarily reflected in the market, but certainly they need to be reflected in
the decisionmaking structures that are created around a water regime. In a
transboundary context like the Great Lakes Region, this would include the
need for both multi-jurisdictional local, state, governments and NGO
collaboration across the border to make sure that the shared resource is
managed through an open-door, participatory process. One model to look at
is the CALFED process, which includes a Bay-Delta Advisory Council with
more than 30 representatives "from the Native American tribes and the
state's leading urban, agricultural, business, environmental and fisheries
interests.''26 Ultimately, such collaborative decisionmaking may both
stimulate and depend for its success on its "transformative" effect on
redefining the interests of the parties, the preferences
of the affected people,
27
and indeed the decisionmaking process itself.
Henry King was waxing eloquent last night about the difficulty of getting
people in the United States to even acknowledge the significance of our
relationship with Canada and take it seriously. That may be true in terms of
what goes on in Washington D.C. or what is printed in The New York Times,
but I think those of you who live in this part of the country recognize that, at
the state and local levels, there is a rich and relatively robust network of
collaborative relationships across the border, in the Great Lakes context and
in other contexts, that needs to be and can be captured to make this process
reality.

26
27

Michel, supra note 18, at 960.
For an interesting examination of these institutional issues in the context of another

complex water basin - the Chesapeake Bay - see Jon Cannon, Choices and Institutions in
Watershed Management, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL.L. & POL'Y REv. 379, 419-25 (2000).
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Let me conclude by coming back to the question of the Harmon Doctrine:
should the peoples and governments of the Great Lakes Region, with its vast
fresh water resources that are significant not only locally but internationally
in terms of the total fresh water resources of the world, be allowed to view
this resource as their own (albeit that these resources are in two countries)?
Should the regional governments be permitted to demand that access be
granted to that resource strictly on their own terms, in a kind of quasiHarmon Doctrine? Or should not the region be considering the equitable
interests, rights, or potential beneficial uses that others outside the region
might have or want to make of this resource?
Knowledgeable people will immediately point out that both the Great
Lakes Charter Annex 2001 and the IJC recommendations do, in fact, set forth
equitable and technical criteria under which withdrawals from the Great
Lakes may be allowed, and these criteria make no distinction between
applicants for withdrawals from within the basin and those from more distant
locations.2 8 The larger question I am raising, however, is not whether the
Great Lakes governments have established reasonable criteria for judging
whether withdrawals or diversions should be permitted, but whether those
governments should set themselves up as the sole and final arbiters of what
the criteria should be and whether any particular proposal meets those
criteria.
The hydrocommons concept and notions of participatory,
decisionmaking and collaborative institution building, developed in regions
where water is scarcer, provide a more politically legitimate and
environmentally sustainable approach.
In the long term, responsible resource management needs to reflect and
incorporate a broader sense of obligation and consideration than the Great
Lakes governments have evinced in their recent policies. Environmental
groups, and the anti-globalization environmentalists most especially, are fond
of talking about "community" and "culture" and the need to preserve these
values. I think that is absolutely correct; those are important values. If we
were to simply turn fresh water into a market commodity that is bought and
sold to the highest bidder, we would run the risk of undermining or
threatening those community and cultural values that are bound up in the
context of the availability of and the traditional uses of water and the
ecological values and services that the water and its associated resources

28

Gary Ballasteros makes a point of emphasizing that Annex 2001, "by establishing a

common conservation-based decisionmaking standard ... rejects an outright ban on water
diversions" and "makes no distinction on its face between in-basin and out-of-basin
diversions." Ballasteros, supra note 14, at 10,615.
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29

represent. We do not want to become beholden to what one writer called
the "gospel of efficiency., 30 Yet the scarcity of the Earth's freshwater
resources and its vital importance for life, environment, and culture makes
efficiency in the use of water an inescapable consideration.
I leave you, at the end, with the larger question to which I think there is
no easy answer but that must be answered by Great Lakes citizens and
leaders as they think about how to oversee and conserve the unique water
resources of their region: whom should we include as part of the community
in which we live? The answer to that question has important consequences,
for everyone in our community, both near and far, should be within the
compass of legal and institutional consideration when making decisions that
affect their interests and their lives.

29 In his book review, David Yoskowitz reports on the work of Maria Rosa GarciaAcevedo: "She argues strongly that the commodity view of water will only increase the
problems between the two governments [Mexico and the United States] and the inhabitants of
the region. When water begins to be defined by its cultural and community significance, then
health change can begin." David W. Yoskowitz, Book Review, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 540,

540 (2001) (reviewing REFLECTIONS ON WATER: NEW APPROACHES TO TRANSBOUNDARY
CONFLICTS AND COOPERATION (Joachim Blatter & Helen Ingram eds., 2001)).
30

See generally SAMUEL P.

HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE

1890-1920 (U. Pitt. Press, 1999) (referring to
turning policy decision-making over to a group of elite scientists and intellectuals, as opposed
to allowing grassroots impulses to join in the process through their elected representatives).
PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT,

